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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the cause of the southern Thailand insurgency and the possibility that 
international terrorist groups have become involved in it.  The insurgency began as an 
ethnic struggle by Malay Muslims for independence from predominantly Buddhist 
Thailand. But with the advent of the “global war on terrorism,” some scholars believe it 
has become an increasingly religious one. They fear that if the insurgency has become 
Islamist, it will attract support from international terrorist groups, which will bring funds, 
training, and ideology to the already violent conflict. This thesis investigates these 
possibilities. It finds that Islam has grown in importance, but the struggle remains driven 
primarily by ethnic separatist, not religious, aims.  Since it remains ethnic in nature, 
international terrorists have not taken a significant role in the movement. The ideological 
gap between them and the insurgents remains too wide. Nevertheless, it is worth 
monitoring the situation as the danger of international terrorists becoming involved exists 
if the insurgency becomes a religious struggle. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
At various times over the past several decades, Malay Muslims in southern 
Thailand have undertaken military campaigns to win independence or autonomy from 
Bangkok. The current campaign began about a decade ago and has resulted in thousands 
of deaths. The conventional wisdom holds that the current conflict—like earlier rounds—
is almost entirely motivated by ethnic differences between Malay and Thai citizens of 
Thailand. However, the coincidence of this round with the rising concern global jihadi 
terrorist networks has led observers to ask whether religion has become a more important 
source of the conflict and whether foreign terrorist networks have become involved in the 
conflict.  
This thesis examines the primary reason the separatists in southern Thailand 
continue to fight, asks whether their motivation to fight has changed in recent years, and 
investigates the role of foreign actors in the conflict.  It illustrates the mutual but varied 
importance of ethnicity and religion for the Malay Muslim fighters and describes the 
level of foreign involvement in the conflict. It is based on the premise that effective 
policies to bring peace to the area must rest on an accurate assessment of why insurgents 
fight and where they obtain support.  If decision makers understand the motivation of the 
fighters, the origins of support for the movement, and the level of foreign government 
support that security forces can rely on, they will be better equipped to design policies to 
end the almost decade-long current iteration of the insurgency. 
The two schools of thought describing the southern Thailand insurgency as either 
ethnic with religious tones or mainly religious reflect two contrasting views of the 
insurgency’s origins.  This thesis assesses the relative importance of ethnicity and 
religion in the conflict. For many years, the movement in southern Thailand has been 
considered an ethnically charged separatist movement that pits a Malay minority against 
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a Thai majority.1  Although authors have recognized that the religions of the two groups 
are different—Malays are mainly Muslim, and Thais are mainly Buddhist—they have 
argued that ethnic difference is the driving factor in the violent conflict.  However, since 
September 2001, it has become more common for some authors to emphasize religious 
differences between the two groups as the main reason for the conflict.2  This thesis will 
examine the logic of these two schools of thought and anticipate the implications of 
international terror group involvement in the border area.  The likelihood of effective 
foreign terrorist influence is anticipated by examining the support structure of the 
insurgency.  If support comes from jihadist organizations, then it would follow that there 
exists a reasonable chance that the insurgency becomes more of a global danger.  If 
support comes from sympathetic Malays in Malaysia or Thailand, the insurgency will 
most likely remain local. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
Malay Muslims in southern Thailand have launched rebellions against Thai rule 
several times since 1903.3  The current iteration of the conflict started in January of 2004 
and continues today. Since then, violence has intensified as insurgents adopt more 
effective tactics, and insurgents now control large parts of the region. As a major non-
NATO ally and a partner in the global war on terrorism, Thailand’s political stability is 
important to the United States. It is important to determine the extent to which 
international terrorist groups are involved in the conflict in southern Thailand to reach the 
most efficient way to end the violence in the region.  If domestic groups typically drive 
                                                 
1 Astri Suhrke, “Loyalists and Separatists: The Muslims in Southern Thailand,” Asian Survey 17:3 
(1977): 237.  See also S. P. Harish, “Ethnic or Religious Cleavage? Investigating the Nature of the Conflict 
in Southern Thailand,” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs  
28:1 (2006): 65. 
2 See Peter Chalk, “Separatism and Southeast Asia: The Islamic Factor in Southern Thailand, 
Mindanao, and Aceh,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 24 (2001): 241–269; Rohan Gunaratna, Arabinda 
Acharya, and Sabrina Chua, eds., Conflict and Terrorism in Southern Thailand (Singapore: Marshall 
Cavendish Academic, 2005); Greg Sheridan, “Jihad Archipelago,” The National Interest 78 (Winter 
2004/2005): 73–80; Joseph Chinyong Liow, “The Security Situation in Southern Thailand: Toward an 
Understanding of Domestic and International Dimensions,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27 (2004): 
531–548; and Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession: The Muslim Communities of the Southern 
Philippines, Southern Thailand, and Western Burma/Myanmar (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002). 
3Gunaratna, Acharya, and Chua, Conflict, 4. 
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the violence, then the best policies will be ones by the Thai government that address the 
concerns of Thai Muslims.  Conversely, if international terrorist groups are involved, 
there may be a greater need for cooperation between Thailand and the United States to 
identify and limit connections between Thai insurgents and their foreign supporters. 
The main divergence in the literature is that some believe the conflict to be 
ethnically-charged, while others believe that the religion of Islam is the driving force.  If 
the source of the violence in southern Thailand is misidentified on this broad of a scope, 
the potential for mishandling the conflict is high.  The school that believes that the 
violence stems from the Muslim heritage of the people in southern Thailand is not 
disingenuous when some assert that the insurgency will (or has) become a focal point of 
international terrorist groups.  If this assumption is false, then the governments of 
Thailand and Malaysia may focus their efforts on people and regions that cannot help the 
problem in the region.  Likewise, scholars who insist that it is an ethnic-based conflict 
may be overlooking the potential for international terrorist group involvement.  The root 
of the conflict must be understood before any actions are taken if they are to be effective.   
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
One of the major problems in the literature dealing with the southern Thailand 
insurgency is the interpretation of the cause of the violence.  Almost all scholars agree 
that religion and ethnicity are involved at some level, but recommended measures to stop 
the conflict depend on which one an author interprets as the main source of the violence.  
While many are able to propose solutions that seem realistic, others tend to adopt a more 
extreme view of the situation.  Gunaratna et al. and Abuza seem convinced that southern 
Thailand is ripe for direct international terrorist group involvement.4 The problem with 
analyses such as these is that the treatment of the people may become as extreme as the 
ideology behind the reason for prosecuting an operation to quell the insurgency.  If the 
Thai security forces begin an all-out military operation because they are convinced that  
 
                                                 
4Zachary Abuza, Conspiracy of Silence:  The Insurgency in Southern Thailand (Washington, DC: 
United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009), 232–233 and Gunaratna, Acharya, and Chua, Conflict, 94–95. 
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southern Thai rebels are directly linked to international terrorist organizations, then it 
may end up being a self-fulfilling prophecy, especially if the United States becomes 
directly involved.   
The problem with misidentifying the root of the insurgency is that, in either case, 
the conflict will be prolonged, and more people will die.  If the scholars who favor an 
ethnic interpretation of the insurgency are wrong, then the potential for actual links to 
international terrorism exist, and appropriate steps must be taken to end this connection 
and keep the insurgency local until it can be resolved.  However, if the scholars who 
believe that religious differences are the main motivation are wrong, then counter-
insurgency policies should not be directed against religious networks; if they are, they 
may actually encourage assistance from international terrorist groups. 
One could frame this problem in relation to support networks for the insurgency.  
If support generally stems from Malay networks, it would follow that the struggle is 
mainly ethnic in nature.  If international terror groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah or Al 
Qaeda contribute major funds to the insurgency, it would seem that the insurgency is 
more of an Islamic struggle.  The former support structure would imply that if conditions 
remain unchanged, the insurgency will continue to be local with cross-border support 
from sympathetic Malays.  The latter support structure implies that the struggle may 
become part of a global jihadist struggle.  Since U.S. forces have left Iraq, an entire 
theater of ideologically-driven fighters has a more limited number Western targets to 
attack.  Thailand, a major ally of the United States, may present a new opportunity for 
these or other fighters. 
My hypothesis is that ethnic differences are the main source of the conflict, but 
because of changing international views on Islam and Malaysia’s official renouncement 
of the insurgency, Islam has become more prominent.  Malaysia’s separation from the 
insurgency is significant because it diminishes the credibility of insurgent groups, which 
claim that rejoining Malaysia is a goal of their struggle.  Once the security forces realize 
that the problem is that the people of southern Thailand simply want to retain their 
culture, it is vital for them not to forget that the people are Muslim.  Islam may not have 
been the reason the Malays in southern Thailand were fighting, but it now plays a role in 
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the ability of the security forces to win the hearts and minds of the populace.  It may also 
play a role in internationalizing the conflict. 
While ethnicity is most likely the root of Malay separatism in southern Thailand, 
the likelihood, or lack thereof, for international terrorist group or government 
involvement should not be ignored.  In recent years, the conflict has become more 
Islamist in nature.5  Harish notes several potential reasons for this.  He states that when 
Thailand attempted to categorize the Malay Muslims as Thai Muslims, Bangkok forced 
its Buddhist-centric definition of ethnicity on the Muslim population.6  Further, as a 
result of the combined effects of Malaysia’s lack of recent support for the insurgency, its 
cooperation with Thailand, and its support for ASEAN’s policy of non-interference,7 the 
Malay aspect of the conflict has taken a back seat to religion.8  Another reason for the 
religious connotation of the insurgency is students traveling to the Middle East to receive 
an Islamic education.9  Finally, Harish believes that viewing the conflict through the 
post-9/11 lens coupled with insurgents’ choices to use key religious sites like the Kru-Ze 
mosque have given the conflict a stronger religious character.10 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The recent episodes of violence in Thailand re-ignited in December of 2001, just 
three months after the infamous attacks in New York City and the Pentagon.  The timing 
of the resurgence is most likely unrelated, but it has presented a convenient lens through 
which to view the struggle in southern Thailand.  Most scholars recognize that the 
problem in southern Thailand now is a domestic struggle that has no international roots.  
However, international terrorist groups may see the struggle as an opportunity to wage 
jihad against a supporter of U.S. foreign policy.  Studies on the issue have yielded two 
                                                 
5 S.P. Harish, “Changing Conflict Identities: The Case of the Southern Thailand Discord,” Singapore: 
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Working Paper Number 107 (2006): 2. 
6 Ibid., 15. 
7 Liow, “Security Situation,” 539. 
8 Harish, “Changing Conflict Identities,” 15. 
9 Ibid., 16. 
10 Ibid. 
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schools of thought relating to international terrorist involvement in the separatist 
movement:  either foreign terrorists play no direct role in the conflict, or they are deeply 
involved.  These schools originate from the scholars’ basis of origin of the problem.  If 
the insurgency tends to gain power through ethnicity more than religion, then 
international terrorist group involvement is less likely than if insurgency originates from 
religious fervor.  Some of the authors who view Islam as the main source for the 
insurgency believe there are solid connections to international terror, but none of the 
authors who find the insurgency to be ethnically-based believe there is direct support 
from transnational terrorist groups.  It is important to analyze the authors’ train of thought 
because if recommendations that stem from each school are based on a misunderstood 
origin, they could provide adverse effects in trying to solve the problem. 
1. Ethnic or Religious? 
The ethnic and religious differences in the southern provinces of Thailand are 
longstanding and have been the source of separatist fighting to some degree for decades.  
Differences in the culture of the Thai Buddhist society have clashed with the culture of 
Malay Muslims in policies of Thai Buddhist inclusion into Thailand.  The importance of 
understanding the motivations of the conflict is to prescribe effective solutions to 
establish a secure environment in the separatist region. 
To understand the root of the insurgency from ethnic and religious perspectives, it 
must be determined what parts of culture are ethnic, and which are religious.  Harish 
identifies ethnic aspects as in language and education, while religious aspects are directly 
stated as either Islam or Buddhist.11  I think this is an effective way to sort out the 
importance of both ethnicity and religion in analysis and determine the source of the 
fighters’ motivation.  Overlap will occur in the education aspect because of the religious 
nature of the pondoks of the region. 
                                                 
11 Harish, “Changing Conflict Identities,” 2. 
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Many scholars thought ethnicity was the cause of the insurgency through the 
1970s.12  Since the rise of trans-national Islamist terrorism, authors have found a new 
framework to analyze the southern Thailand insurgency.13  During the 1900s, and into the 
Thaksin regime in the early 2000s, there was a concerted effort by Bangkok to 
incorporate all people living within the borders of Thailand into the Thai culture.  While 
there is still freedom for subjects to practice the religion of their choice, Thai authorities 
have attempted to change the Islamic way of dress and method of schooling in the south.  
Part of the changes in schooling involved learning the Thai language to prepare for the 
national exam.  Another part of being a Thai subject is allegiance to the King, who is 
seen as part Buddhist God.  This aspect is part of Thai culture, but many Malays view it 
as an affront to their Islamic religion.  Also, Bangkok initiated a campaign to include all 
Muslims, not just the Malay Muslims in the south, into a category called “Thai 
Muslim.”14  Along with these changes, Thai news reports of the violence increasingly 
refer to the insurgents by their Islamic religious affiliation rather than their ethnicity.  A 
September 2011 attack in a prison described Muslim inmates attacking Buddhist assistant 
jailers.15  A December 2011 attack describes the perpetrators on Yala as “two teenage 
men wearing Muslim caps.”16  News reports rarely mention that insurgents are Malay.  
While these descriptions are accurate, they are not complete, as it is a valid assumption 
that Muslims in the three Southern regions are also Malay.  These reports reflect how 
Thais frame the conflict, not necessarily how the insurgents view their struggle.  In 
                                                 
12 Ibid.; Nantawan Haemindra, “The Problem of the Thai-Muslims in the Four Southern Provinces of 
Thailand (Part 1),” Journal of Southeast Asia Studies 7:2 (1976): 197–225; Nantawan Haemindra, “The 
Problem of the Thai-Muslims in the Four Southern Provinces of Thailand (Part 2),” Journal of Southeast 
Asia Studies 8:1 (1977): 85–105.; Astri Suhrke, “Irredentism Contained: The Thai Muslim Case,” 
Comparative Politics Comparative Politics 7:2 (1975): 187–203; and Astri Suhrke, “Loyalists and 
Separatists,” 237–250. 
13 Chalk, “Separatism,” 242–243.  See also Harish, “Changing Conflict Identities,” 1–2. 
14 Harish, “Changing Conflict Identities,” 10. 
15 “1 Buddhist Inmate Killed, 2 Others Injured in Pattani Prison Riot by Muslim Inmates,” The 
Nation, September 5, 2011. Accessed February 5, 2012. 
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/breakingnews/1-Buddhist-inmate-killed-2-others-injured-in-Patta-
30164512.html. 
16 “Insurgents Launch New Attacks in South,” The Nation, December 14, 2011. Accessed March 21, 
2012. http://www.nationmultimedia.com/national/Insurgents-launch-new-attacks-in-South-30171822.html. 
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efforts to change the culture of the region to incorporate the Thai Subjects into the 
borders, leaders in Bangkok have may re-characterized the conflict to a religious nature. 
Most contemporary authors believe that the insurgency is taking on a religious 
context.  McCargo states that insurgent leaders use religion as a common thread of 
motivation and recruitment of militants, but he is careful to distinguish the use of Islam 
from defining the conflict as Islamist.17  Liow and Pathan use a similar argument to 
McCargo’s that although religion is a motivation mechanism, it is also a long standing 
part of the Malay culture in the southern provinces and violence has not spread to 
Bangkok or even Phuket Province.18  Liow has held this position since the most recent 
episode of violence began in 2004 when he stated that the violence in southern Thailand 
stems from “a range of social and political forces” involving both provincial leadership 
and government forces that “cannot be purely attributed to a phenomenon of Islamist 
violence and separatism.”19 
In contrast, there are two notable authors who believe that Islam is central to the 
root of the insurgency, and should be dealt with as such.  Gunaratna, a noted expert on 
international terror, wrote in 2004 that the Islamic religion with local and political 
influence drove the separatist movement against Bangkok.20  He states that the 
insurgency stems from ethic and religious grievances the Muslim-Malay people in 
southern Thailand have against the government of Thailand through years of forced 
assimilation, poor administrative procedures, lack of knowledge and sensitivity of the 
populace, and the emplacement of economic disadvantages.21  However, throughout the 
book, he refers to the people of the southern provinces as Muslim or Islamist.22  Abuza 
also casts the problem in a religious light for the cause of the insurgency.  He states that 
                                                 
17 Duncan McCargo, Tearing Apart the Land: Islam and Legitimacy in Southern Thailand (Ithaca, 
New York: Cornell University Press, 2008): 188. 
18 Joseph Chinyong Liow and Don Pathan, “Confronting Ghosts: Thailand’s Shapeless Southern 
Insurgency,” Lowry Institute for International Policy, Paper No. 30 (2010): 44–45. 
19 Liow, “Security Situation,” 544. 
20 Gunaratna, Acharya, and Chua, Conflict, 9. 
21 Ibid., 10–15. 
22 Ibid., 107. 
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while the problems of militancy in Southeast Asia were generally localized, leaders of 
these movements saw an opportunity to gain greater attention so as not to be seen as part 
of the “Islamic periphery,” causing militants to take a more hard-line Islamic stance.23  In 
2009, he stated, “the conflict in the south is more religious in nature than it ever has 
been.”24  Abuza developed his opinion from interviews taken from former and current 
militants who state that leaders of the insurgency are using religion as a motivator.25 
The origins of the southern Thai insurgency lie in the ethnic roots of the Malay 
people of the three southern provinces, and past analysis has described the conflict as 
such.  In the past decade, however, both analysis of the insurgency and motivation for 
fighting have emphasized the importance of religion.  Both parties of the argument 
recognize the importance of ethnicity and religion as key motivating factors, but applying 
a prescription for ending the militancy of the movement may be improperly managed if it 
is trying to solve the wrong problem.   
2. Involvement of Foreign Elements 
A significant group of authors believes that the southern Thailand insurgency 
receives material support from foreign terrorists, while another influential group believes 
that there is limited and indirect support from foreign terrorists, if any, in the conflict.  
The use of tactics similar to those used in Iraq would lead one to believe that outside 
forces are involved due to the complexity of much of the bomb making, but the fact that 
the conflict has not spread outside of the four southern-most provinces may signify that 
the conflict remains a local struggle.  It is important to determine if there are international 
terror ties to the conflict because a proper prescription for regional peace requires 
accurate intelligence regarding the true actors and supporters.  If the conflict is a mainly 
local struggle, treating it with the assumption elements of Jemaah Islamiyah or Al Qaeda 
                                                 
23 Zachary Abuza, “Learning by Doing: Al Qaeda’s Allies in Southeast Asia,” Current History, 
103:672 (2004): 171. 
24 Abuza, Conspiracy, 126. 
25 Ibid and Eliza Griswold, “Dispatches from Southern Thailand Entry 2:  Fighting With Ghosts,” 




are active could lead to outside involvement from the United States, thus inviting 
international terrorists to the conflict.  If international terrorists are involved, and the 
insurgency is dealt with as a localized problem, support may continue without the 
government’s knowledge.  In either case, the prospects for peace seem limited without 
knowing who is fighting and what their motives are. 
One school of thought suggests that international terrorist organizations are not 
involved in materially supporting the southern Thai separatist movement.  Scholars who 
subscribe to this belief realize that international terrorist groups like Al Qaeda and 
insurgent sympathizers in northern Malaysia train insurgent leaders, but these authors 
state that there is no evidence linking “outside terrorist groups” to the recent increase in 
violent activity.26  Evidence of support from these authors typically focuses around ethnic 
Malay networks such as pondoks, soup kitchens, and training camps in northern 
Malaysia.  Predictably, proponents of this view advocate change in Thai policies toward 
the region in order to end the violence; mainly, they propose a series of concessions to 
the afflicted Malay Muslims.  Generally speaking, this group views the conflict as one of 
ethnic rather than religious strife, and therefore believes that there is little reason for 
international Islamic terrorist groups to provide direct support to the insurgents.  
This school asserts that while international terrorist groups are nominally involved 
in the southern Thailand insurgency, the problem is ultimately domestic and calls for 
domestic solutions.  These authors view the Islamic aspect of the Malay ethnicity as a 
significant factor to the continued violence but put much of the responsibility on the Thai 
government for failed policies.  J. C. Liow, a leading author on the southern Thailand 
insurgency, states that while international assistance from Islamic states and 
organizations needs to be addressed, the main issue is that Thailand has created an 
environment for such activity to occur.27  Yegar believes that any international 
involvement is minimal and strictly financial, thus not a determining factor in the 
continuation of violence.28  He also believes that the responsibility for the continuation of 
                                                 
26 International Crisis Group, “Southern Thailand: The Impact of the Coup,” Asia Report Number 129 
(2007): 7. 
27 Liow, “Security Situation,” 544. 
28 Yegar, Between Integration, 170. 
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violence lies in Thailand’s lack of effective responsiveness in the region.29  This school 
of thought believes that religion plays a major role in the conflict, but the impact of 
international terrorist groups plays far less of a role than local Thai policies.  
In recent years, Thai and Malaysian security forces have collected data that point 
to a softer role of foreign influence in the southern Thailand insurgency.  In their 
cooperation, they have found that elements in Malaysia are operating to provide 
sanctuary, logistical support and arms manufacturing, and financing.30  Today, scholars 
estimate that nearly 800 individuals with connections to the conflict and over 100 
insurgent leaders live somewhat permanently in Malaysia, but they are under surveillance 
by the Special Branch of the Royal Malaysian Police.  Once these individuals act in a 
manner that could jeopardize Malaysia’s official neutrality, the criminals are arrested and 
extradited to Thailand, as was the case with the “PULO Four” who were arrested in 1998 
for conspiring to disrupt economic and diplomatic relations between Bangkok and Kuala 
Lumpur.31  Additionally, in January of 2005, Thai authorities arrested Dorormae Kuteh, 
who established the Gerakan Mujahedeen Islam Patani (GMIP), by pressuring Malaysia 
for extradition.32  
 Trafficking of humans, weapons, and drugs across the porous Thai-Malaysia 
border is a primary concern for the Royal Thai Army and the Border Police in the area, 
but with the on-going insurgency, there is an increased alertness in trafficking, especially 
weapons and bomb-making materials.  Pressure from Thai security forces has driven 
bomb makers out of the area, but they have fled to Malaysia as it is a more permissive 
environment for such illicit activities.  However, this is not to say that Malaysia is 
officially neglecting to combat the problem.  In December of 2009, locals tipped off the 
Kelantan Criminal Investigation Department to an IED supply cache in Pasir Mas, 
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approximately 10 km from the border.  Thai intelligence believed there were four or five 
more such caches.33  Malaysia is a more permissive environment for IED manufacture, 
but the government is not directly affected by the violence of the insurgency within its 
borders, causing scarce security resources to migrate elsewhere around Malaysia where 
decision makers believe they will yield better results.  Still, Malaysia’s efforts to combat 
these caches demonstrate that while there may be local sympathizers in the border region, 
Kuala Lumpur officially does not support the insurgency. 
 Another form of support from non-official agencies has been funding.  Authorities 
have documented that shopkeepers and soup kitchens in Malaysia are providing funding 
for the insurgency in southern Thailand.34  Davis believes that while it is difficult to 
estimate the amount of money funding the insurgency, it is likely a relatively small 
amount, due in part to skimming along the process.35  Then-Prime Minister Surayud 
Chulanont’s comments in 2007 that Malaysian soup kitchens were a major source of 
funding were probably false but absolutely angered the government in Kuala Lumpur.36  
Again, there is evidence that suggests Malaysians are providing support, but the official 
stance of Malaysia is noninterference. 
 The majority of the authors in the field believe that the insurgency is rooted in 
ethnicity, with religion being an important aspect of the problem.  Since the insurgency is 
believed to be rooted in ethnic separatism, it seems unlikely the fighters would welcome 
help from transnational terrorists who could bring following eyes from much larger 
nations like the United States with them.  However, if international terrorists are at work 
to support the insurgency, a prescription based on a lack of transnational terrorist 
involvement could be a waste. 
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A drastically different view emphasizes the religious nature of the conflict in 
southern Thailand and argues that international terrorist support is highly integrated into 
many aspects of the southern Thai insurgency.  This school argues that the violence must 
be reined in by controlling the international terrorist support.  The main proponent for 
this view is Rohan Gunaratna in his book Conflict and Terrorism in Southern Thailand.  
Gunaratna has examined the situation in southern Thailand with a team of authors and 
determined that the basis of the conflict has shifted from ethnicity to religion since 2004 
when the current round of violence began.37  This line of thinking, as well as assuming 
international terrorist groups have a significant level of control over the insurgency, led 
Gunaratna to the conclusion that the first step in ending the insurgency is to disrupt the 
linkages between Thai insurgents and foreign terrorists.38 
 Gunaratna and Abuza are the prominent authors who believe this scenario 
represents reality.  Many authors like Davis, Abuza, Gunaratna, and Chalk recognize that 
there is an international terrorist presence in southern Thailand, but Gunaratna and Abuza 
are the primary scholars who draw a clear connection to the unrest in southern Thailand 
to the presence of Al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah operatives in the region.  Abuza’s 
recent findings that international terrorist groups like Jemaah Islamiyah have been and 
are operating in the region conflict with his previous research that “there have never been 
strong ties to the Muslim insurgency in southern Thailand and international terrorist 
groups.”39  Abuza previously placed much of the blame on Thailand’s lax immigration 
laws, involvement in weapons smuggling, and desire to become an international financial 
leader have led the nation to become a “nation of convenience” for Al-Qaeda.40  Chalk 
tends to agree with Abuza’s first position in this matter, that it seems that international 
terrorist groups may want to be active in the region, but Chalk states that the Malay 
Muslim movement wants nothing to do with international terror.  From interviews from 
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leaders of the insurgent movement, Chalk suggests that support from Jemaah Islamiyah is 
not wanted because they view the group as “bad news.”41 
 It seems that from this school of thought that there is a danger of believing that 
because international terrorists are present in Thailand that they are involved with the 
insurgency in the south.  Most scholars believe this to be false, but a chance exists that it 
may be the case.  It seems unlikely, though, for two main reasons.  First, the conflict is 
extremely localized and has not spread to Western/American targets.  Second, the CIA 
and other powerful intelligence agencies had been actively tracking international 
terrorists in Thailand since at least 1998 when the CIA warned of a Pakistani threat to 
American interests in Thailand.42  With over a decade of intelligence collecting, there is 
still no hard proof that international terrorist groups are connected to the Malay Muslim 
insurgency.  However, the importance of this argument is that it may give usable 
planning considerations as to how to combat the insurgency should Jemaah Islamiyah or 
Al-Qaeda be incorporated.  It is also important for the problem of combating international 
terrorist funding and destroying safe havens, but as for solving the problem of today’s 
Malay Muslim insurgency, it has little value other than hypothetical planning. 
 While there is a debate on the involvement of international terrorist groups, there 
is little room for debate that there are international influences on the insurgency.  One of 
the main forms of international support for the southern Thailand insurgency is through 
international schooling.  Davis states that the Barisan Revolusi Nasional Coordinate 
(BRN-C) and the Islamic Association of University Students of Patani (Southern 
Thailand) in Indonesia (PMIPTI) are working together to assess and train recruits to fight 
in southern Thailand.43  The Thai “students” that are sent to Indonesia are trained on 
military field craft and guerilla warfare.  The BRN-C has also set up local training areas 
in Thailand’s secluded national parks conducting the same type training.44  Training in 
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Indonesia sometimes took up to one year as Malay Muslims from Thailand reported to 
PMIPTI houses that provided cover that allowed the trainees not to be enrolled in 
academic studies.  This cover-up allowed them an opportunity for full-time training.45  
PMIPTI is not an official arm of Jakarta, but it is another case where people from outside 
of Thailand are taking an expressed interest in the insurgency. 
 Scholars still believe that there are hard connections to Al-Qaeda and/or Jemaah 
Islamiyah.  Sheridan believes that the timing of the 2004 “upsurge in violence…that is 
most suggestive of Jemaah Islamiyah and Al-Qaeda influence.”46  He further states that 
while there probably is no connection of the insurgency to the two, it provides a lens to 
view the plight of the Malay Muslim.  This statement is hardly asserting that there is a 
hard connection to Al-Qaeda and the southern insurgency. Paul Quaglia of PSA Asia 
believes that since the uptick in violence and coordination is unprecedented, it is likely 
that Jemaah Islamiyah or Al-Qaeda is facilitating the insurgency with funds or training.47  
Thai officials believe there is a connection but cannot offer hard proof.48  While there 
may not be hard connections to international terrorist groups, in the post-9/11 world, 
these actors can provide an ideological rally point for the southern Thailand insurgents. 
International terrorist support for the southern Thailand insurgency may seem a 
reasonable aspect of the fight given the post-9/11 lens and the documented presence of 
Jemaah Islamiyah actors in and around Thailand, but if they are not actively supportive, 
efforts to severe the supposed ties would be a waste of effort and/or alienate the populace 
of the three southern provinces affect by the violence.  It is inherent that if the insurgency 
is to end that decision makers apply appropriate policies, and knowledge of the actors and 
their motivations is necessary.  Government leaders must use caution not to apply more 
ineffective policies because the level of violence is as high as areas with international 
terrorist involvement. 
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The key difference in the literature concerns the relative importance of religious 
and ethnic differences.  All analysts recognize that the Malays in southern Thailand are 
generally Muslim, but they differ over the role that Islam plays in motivating violent 
actions against Thai security forces and Thai civilians. While there had been some 
argument before September 2001 that the conflict was religiously based, most of the 
literature that makes this assumption was written and published after 2001.  I believe the 
reason more analysts have come to this conclusion is that in today’s security 
environment, there is a convenient framework of extremist Islamic terror that can be 
easily molded to fit the conflict in southern Thailand.  While their conclusions may be 
true, it seems bold to neglect 600 years of ethnic strife.  It may be that boldness that 
frames the problem to find solutions that minimize or end any foreign support for the 
insurgency to facilitate peace. 
Determining the presence of international terrorist groups in the southern 
Thailand insurgency is critical to bringing peace to the region because policy makers 
must know who they are fighting and what motivates them to continue.  It is also 
important to distinguish between the members of Al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah, or other 
terrorist groups that may be using Thailand because of its permissive environment for 
various criminal activities and the militants in the south.  The presence of these 
international terrorists within the borders of Thailand does not necessarily draw the 
conclusion that they are aiding the southern fighter.  It is unlikely that international 
terrorist directly support efforts in the south, but southern militants have gone to train 
overseas.  Policy makers need a clear understanding of how international organizations 
support the insurgency to prescribe effective operations to the region, and influence 
policy makers in Indonesia and Malaysia. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis is a case study that examines the southern Thailand insurgency in 
order to provide policy recommendations that could prove useful once the cause of the 
insurgency is determined.  In this current state of world affairs, this insurgency is unique 
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and holds a value that other insurgencies do not.  The southern Thailand conflict has been 
ongoing since the 1800s and continues until this day.  The analytical approach of a case 
study affords the opportunity to refine a school of thought that an insurgency comprised 
of Muslim fighters does not necessarily mean that it is a Muslim insurgency.  Because 
most of the problem with the policies involving the insurgency stem from the debate 
regarding the origin of the violence, secondary sources comprise most of the references 
of this thesis. 
Chapter II of this thesis examines the importance of ethnicity and religion in the 
southern Thailand insurgency over its long history.  Chapter III discusses the presence or 
absence of foreign terrorist involvement in the four provinces.  The thesis concludes with 
recommendations for Thai and Malaysian policy in the region to resolve the violent 
situation.  The conclusion brings ethnic and religious concerns together and formulates 
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II. CULTURAL OR RELIGIOUS? 
The cause and motivation of the insurgency is one of the key aspects to solving 
the problem.  There is a conflict in the literature on the subject regarding whether the 
insurgency stems from an ethnic or religious source.  While both parties recognize the 
other factor plays an important part in driving the violence, it is important to apply 
solutions that will affect the true motivation of the militants.  This chapter shows that 
while the insurgency began as mainly an ethno-political struggle by the Malay Muslims, 
it has taken on a more religious connotation, due in no small part to the Thai 
government’s actions of assimilation and a failed execution of counter-insurgency.  There 
are four main factors of the shift to an Islamic identity of the insurgency comprised of 
Thai policies of assimilation, diminishing Malaysian support, Middle Eastern education 
of southern Thais, and the reality of the Global War on Terror.49  These factors 
contributed to a generational shift in motivation noticed by a former Barisan Revolusi 
Nasional leader from state separatism to religious fervor.50  The problem in the south 
should be attacked with the understanding that the new generation has religious 
motivation and identity, though the focus is still mainly ethnically separatist.  This 
chapter describes each of these four factors in relation to the shift and concludes with 
implications of the different perspectives on the issue of origin and motivation. 
A.  HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF ISLAM IN SOUTHERN THAILAND 
Malay Muslims’ desire for independence and autonomy in southern Thailand has 
a history almost as long as Islam has in the region.  It is not known exactly when Islam 
was introduced into what is now southern Thailand, but it was potentially as early as the 
1300s.  The settlements began when Arab and Persian traders used ports in the Malay 
Peninsula and the Indonesian Archipelago along their trading routes with China.  When 
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traders married local women and raised children as Muslims, the seeds of Islam had been 
sown in the Patani region.  In 1457, the Patani Kingdom was established as an Islamic 
state, even though the local brand of Islam in the region incorporated animistic and Hindu 
beliefs.51  The Kingdom of Patani should not be confused with the Thai Province of 
Pattani.  According to McCargo, Patani “alludes to an older and larger area, and may 
carry Malay nationalist connotations.”52  He explains that Patani is the former Islamic 
kingdom, while Pattani is the name of the Thai province in the region Patani once 
existed.  The presence or absence of one “t” can cause quite different feelings in the 
people in the southern border provinces of Thailand. 
While the Sultanate of Patani was growing in prominence, the Kingdom of Siam 
was expanding southward into the neighboring Songkhla region.  The Siamese rulers 
began to exert control over Malay sultans through tribute, conscription, and the ability to 
veto new sultans if the predecessor died.  When the Siamese kings were powerful, Malay 
sultans were amiable in paying tribute, but they were more likely to disregard such 
payments when the Kingdom was weak.  It is arguable how much control Siam exerted 
over the Malay sultans, but scholars believe that there was considerable desire to be rid of 
Siamese (later Thai) control as early as the late 1400s.53 
The Malays from Patani and the Siamese Kingdom went through a series of 
struggles as Siam gained and lost power.  Siam was able to continue exerting control 
southwards when Patani was captured by the Portuguese in 1511.  Even though the newly 
acquired sultanates of Patani, Kedah, Terengganu, and Kelantan operated with a great 
deal of autonomy, revolts against Siam began in the 1600s and continued into the 1700s.  
Siam signed a treaty with Portugal that allowed for the use of Patani as an intermediary 
trade city for trade with China and Japan.  This agreement made Patani a central trade 
hub between Malacca and China for approximately 150 years.  Siam maintained control 
of the region as the Portuguese, British, and French were indifferent to the situation.  
After Siam was defeated by Burma in 1767, Patani had an opportunity to gain 
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independence, but King Rama I quickly rebuilt military power after the war of 1785 and 
moved into Patani to reassert control.  This move only served to strengthen the resolve of 
the sultanates from 1789 to 1791, resulting in the reconquering of Patani after an 1808 
uprising.  Siam divided the region into seven small districts that were nominally 
autonomous while heavily controlled by a Siamese governor living in Songkhla.  
Rebellions broke out in 1832 and 1838, causing Siam to reassert authority and reduce the 
power of the Malay districts.  While Patani districts were under heavy Siamese control, 
they were still afforded the opportunity to enact laws, collect taxes and oversee the day-
to-day government operations as they saw fit.  This quasi-autonomy continued until the 
British began exerting power northward from Malaya.54 
In the 1800s, the British were concerned with maintaining peace and order in the 
region to protect their interests.  The Anglo-Siamese treaty of 1897 ensured Siam’s 
sovereignty over Kelantan and Terengganu and British exclusivity in the Malay 
Peninsula.  Britain believed that Siam was incapable of protecting its interests in the 
northern Malaya/southern Siam region and began attempting to undermine Siamese rule 
in the region to gain more influence.  To combat this attempt, Siam conducted a large-
scale overhaul of governance in the region beginning in 1892.  Siamese governors 
replaced Malay rulers.  The payment of tribute ended, and the Siamese established a 
formal tax structure.  The seven semi-autonomous regions were reconsolidated and 
placed under a Siamese governor’s oversight that was directly responsible to the Siamese 
Department of the Interior.  Sharia law in official business ended, but the Malays were 
still allowed the practice in personal affairs.  Siamese authorities restricted Malay Muslim 
judges from actively sitting in courts.  They were relegated to advisory duties.  These 
actions angered the sultanates, especially the sultans of Patani and Kelantan.  A new 
round of British treaties undermined the ability of the Malay states to revolt by presenting 
a compelling case for Siam to sign treaties with Kelantan and Terengganu.  The treaty did 
not include Patani, diplomatically alienating the sultanate from the others that were now 
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effectively under British Protectorate status.  The British seemed to have little concern 
over the fate of Patani as anti-Siamese sentiment continued to rise.55 
The Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909 set the border between what is now Malaysia 
and Thailand.56  The separation included into Siam what are now the districts of Pattani, 
Narathiwat, and Yala.  The British maintained influence over Kelantan, Terengganu, 
Kedah, and Perlis and gave up extra-territorial privileges with Siam.  While the level of 
control by Thai-speaking officials in the border provinces was arguably negligible, the 
creation of an administrative border between the Malays of Siam and British Malaya 
firmed bitterness toward the Siam state.57 
Once Britain recognized the Southern Siam border states as Siamese, efforts 
began to implement policies to bring the Malay Muslims under the scope of the Siamese-
Buddhist state.  In 1921, one of the first moves made was to close down traditional 
pondok schools and force children into national schools with instruction in Thai.58  This 
policy led to uprisings due to the perception that Siam was attempting to downgrade the 
role of the religion of Islam and the Malay culture.  Uprisings in 1922 and 1923 caused 
the Siamese government to scale back on these policies, partly due to support the 
southern provinces received from nationalist sympathizers in northern Malaya.59  The 
1932 revolution that was based on a Thai nationalism again attempted to draw in ethnic 
minorities into the Thai nation, but it was met with resistance in the south.  Two major 
points of contention at this time were an attempt to classify the Malay Muslims as Thai 
Muslims and the replacing of Muslim administrators with Thai officials.60 
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B. SHIFT FROM ETHNIC TO RELIGIOUS FOCUS 
Since the end of World War II, factors existed to shift the focus of the fighting 
from ethnic to religious.  There are four main reasons for this shift, some of which the 
Thai government had control over in some degree, and others they have not.  These main 
reasons are Thai assimilation policies, a lack of official support from Malaysia to the 
militants, students becoming more educated in Islamic issues abroad, and a general fear 
of the global spread of terrorism after 9/11.61 
1.  Post-World War II Assimilation Policies 
Separatist sentiment continued during and after World War II, during which 
Thailand was an ally to Japan, mainly due to the assimilation aspirations of former Field 
Marshall, then Prime Minister Pibul Songkhram who came to power in December 1938.  
His assignment to the new office sparked another round of violence and separatism.  Six 
months later, he changed the country’s name from Siam to Thailand.62  The new regime 
passed decrees that banned traditional Muslim clothing.  Offenders, especially high 
ranking officials, were subject to fines or police beatings.63  The alliance with Japan, 
therefore, against Britain, allowed Thailand to regain possession of Kelantan, 
Terengganu, Kedah, and Perlis, along with other provinces formerly belonging to Laos, 
Cambodia, and Burma.  This takeover further fueled the flames of separatism and 
strengthened Southern Thailand Muslim’s ties with their neighbors in Malaya.64  The fall 
of Japan brought about the fall of Pibul and ushered in the reign of Pridi.  He brought a 
new strategy that dissolved forced assimilation but utilized government oversight into the 
Islamic dealings.  Royal decrees in 1947 and 1948 called for additions to the Patronage of 
Islam Act that provided supervision and supported Islamic functionaries.65  A major step 
towards including Malay Muslims in the Thai government was the addition of the 
Chularajamontri, considered a spiritual leader for all Muslims in Thailand.  The king 
                                                 
61 Harish, “Changing Conflict Identities,” 15–16. 
62 Yegar, Between Integration, 90. 
63 Ibid., 91. 
64 Ibid., 93. 
65 Ibid., 95. 
 24
appointed the Chularajamontri who was to serve as his advisor on all matters Islam.66  
The movement towards Muslim advisors for Thai government officials took hold in the 
southern provinces, and the separatist movement quieted, although there were still 
numerous Malay Muslims who refused to obey edicts from the Chularajamontri.67  The 
settling was only temporary as post-war Malays had a new-found sense of nationalism 
and militants began training in Malaya.68  Pridi was ousted in 1948, and Thailand and the 
Malay Muslims found themselves under the rule and harsh policies of Pibul once again.69 
Strong separatist sentiment continued through the 1970s and began to cool down 
during the Prem and Chatichai governments took control.  During their terms, both 
leaders made genuine efforts to assimilate the Malay Muslims into the Thai bureaucratic 
system while maintaining Malay identity. These regimes fostered the establishment of the 
Southern Border Provincial Administration Center (SBPAC) in 1981, attempted 
development of the local economy, and the democratization of Thai politics.70  The 
SBPAC’s stated goal was to educate Thais on the culture of the Malay Muslims, and it 
also served as an official link from the border provinces to Bangkok.71  The Thai capital 
attempted to revitalize the economy of the southern provinces with tourism and 
entertainment (sectors in which Thailand arguably has a comparative advantage), but the 
effort was met with strong resistance due to conflicts with Muslim beliefs and a 
perception that Bangkok would fill key positions with Thais.72  The democratization of 
Thai politics allowed for direct representation from the southern provinces via the 
Democrat Party and New Aspiration Party.73  While these policies were not perfect,  
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partly due to the Army’s heavy hand in the democratic process and misguided economic 
development plans, they did co-opt the Malay elites and kept violence down for two 
decades.74 
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, a former police officer, came to power 
through the efforts of the now-banned Thai Rak Thai (Thais Love Thais) Party in 2001 
and implemented his own assimilation policies with a mix of heavy-handed operations.  
The current rounds of the separatist movement began in December 2001 when five police 
officers were killed in attacks on five police posts in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat.75  In 
May of 2002, Thaksin abolished the SBPAC and initiated martial law in the region.76  
The move towards martial law was an attempt to gain power in the border provinces for 
his own political machine, but he effectively dismantled the Malay system that held the 
region relatively peaceful since the 1980s.77  Thaksin and his advisors witnessed the up-
tick in violence, but the arrogance of the regime concluded that the spike was due to 
criminal thuggery.78  In 2004, when coordinated attacks began, they began believing 
otherwise.  2004 is considered the beginning of the most recent attacks that got the 
attention of terrorism expert like Gunaratna and Abuza.  It is also the point where more 
authors begin citing religion more as the cause for the insurgency.  This section describes 
how Thaksin’s policies helped to cause the latest decade-long episode of violence and 
how his administration and those following him gave the insurgents more reason to rally 
around Islam for motivation. 
a. Thaksin’s Martial Law in the Southern Provinces 
 By January 8, 2004, Thaksin had placed the provinces of Yala, 
Narathiwat, and Pattani under martial law.79  The declaration followed the January 4 
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attacks in Narathiwat Province that burned 20 schools and blocked roads as diversionary 
tactics for the main objective to raid the Joh-Ai-Rong Army Base, resulting in 
approximately 100 stolen assault rifles.80  Thaksin blamed the attack on culprits who 
were “mainly involved with crime, arms smuggling, and narcotics” traveling between 
Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia.81  Defense Minister Thamarak Isaragura made a 
conflicting statement in an interview with a private radio station.  He stated that the 
militants may have been attempting to persuade international terrorist groups to support 
their efforts.82  Most analysts would view a decisive response by a state leader to such a 
dramatic attack as rational, especially since the area had been experiencing significant 
violence since 2001.  Thaksin, however, took a particularly harsh approach, further 
alienating the Malay Muslims from the Thai state.  At this point, defense leaders are 
beginning to voice their opinions that there could be more to the movement than ordinary 
crime. 
 As martial law continued, so did the violence.  On April 28, 2004, 
militants attacked 12 different locations in Pattani, Narathiwat, and Yala provinces, 
resulting in 105 dead attackers.  Some attackers were lightly armed while others were 
unarmed. Still, they continued to attack security strongholds.83  The final standoff for the 
day happened at Kru-Ze mosque in Pattani where 32 militants were killed inside the 
mosque.84  The attackers entered the mosque and continued firing, resulting in Thai 
security forces attacking the perpetrators who were seeking refuge inside the mosque.  
McCargo interviewed military officers involved in the incident, and all believed that they 
were fulfilling their basic duty as soldiers by neutralizing the militants inside the Kru-Ze 
mosque.85  Thaksin again connected the attacks to drug addicts and claimed victory.86  
While April 28, 2004, could be considered a tactical success that ended in many militants 
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removed from the streets through either death or arrests, it is clear that Bangkok suffered 
a strategic loss by attacking one of the most holy structures for Southeast Asian Muslims.  
This act was a major contributing factor to the insurgency moving from an ethnic base to 
a religious base due to the gravity of attacking one of, if not the most, important Muslim 
holy sites in the ancient Patani region. 
 The trend of strategic failure saw another landmark event on October 25, 
2004, in what is commonly referred to as the Tak Bai Incident.  Approximately 1500 
protestors demanded the release of security volunteers they felt had been wrongfully 
imprisoned.87  Seventy-eight people died, mostly due to suffocation after more than 1000 
arrested protestors were packed in to trucks for transportation to military camps.88  This 
incident created local and global outrage, especially among Muslim groups.  It was 
nothing but a strategic failure. 
 Martial law in the southern provinces was counterproductive.  Violence 
increased during the period of martial law.  In order to achieve a level of stability, Liow 
recommended that Thaksin should have reduced overt military presence and improved 
intelligence gathering and communication with key Muslim leaders.89  While these 
attacks and protests certainly had a religious connotation, it was ultimately a general lack 
of concern for the humanity of the people that caused the violence to continue. 
b. Thaksin’s Punishment of Neighborhoods Supporting 
Insurgency: Red, Yellow, and Green Zones 
 One of the potential reasons the separatist movement still exists in 
southern Thailand is because the Malay-Muslims have been treated in a heavy-handed 
manner.  Thaksin’s police background manifested itself when in 2005 he pursued the red, 
yellow, and green classification of neighborhoods for providing economic benefit to the 
friendly neighborhoods.  In this program, designed specifically to end the insurgency, if 
there was little crime and the populace cooperated with authorities, the village was 
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designated “green” and received full developmental assistance and monetary aid.  
Conversely, “red” villages where violence was prevalent and cooperation was less than 
enthusiastic received no state developmental assistance.  The result of the program was 
that the people became further disenchanted with the government in Bangkok and may 
have converted to militancy.90  Programs like these, as well as excessive police force, 
must end if the Thai government wishes to develop a legitimate reputation to win the 
hearts and minds of the people it wishes to make productive Thai citizens. 
 It is important to consider the effectiveness of a policy such as 
neighborhood zoning that seeks to punish perceived government separatists.  While there 
was a policy of zoning neighborhoods, there was no connection to budgets and zones.91  
Thaksin made public comments that neighborhood zones should be tied to budgets so that 
“red” zones would not receive government funds due to their lack of compliance, but in 
reality, this plan was never implemented.92  Certainly Thaksin’s words could be used as a 
rallying point for separatists, but since the plan was not executed, it is irrelevant to draw 
any conclusions as to its effects.  The perception that Thaksin would believe that such a 
plan would aid in the pacification of Malay-Muslims in the south is an important 
testament to his general belief that security forces should deal with the violence in a 
heavy-handed manner. 
 In sum, Thaksin’s rule created an environment that was stricken with 
violence and further drove the rift between the Thais and Malays apart.  His heavy-
handed tactics and misguided intelligence about the root causes of the attacks only built 
resentment for the Thai state.  The abolishment of the SBPAC is further evidence that 
Thaksin had no real intentions of connecting with the Malay Muslim populace.  He 
continued publicly to blame Malaysia and Indonesia for aiding the insurgency, which 
harmed relations and potential for cooperation.  At least publicly, Thaksin did not believe 
that the insurgency was based in ethnic or religious terms, though members of his 
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Ministry of defense believed it was potentially religious in nature.93  His lack of 
understanding of the root of the insurgency set efforts to calm the region back decades 
and resulted in violence that continues today. 
2. Lack of Support from Malaysia 
Since the late 1400s, when the struggle for autonomy from Siam began, leaders 
have been able to use ethnicity as an underlying cause to for separatism.  Later in the 20th 
century, however, Malaysia has taken a stance that it will not interfere in the insurgency 
and pledged to aid Thailand in apprehending suspects in an effort to stabilize the region 
economically.94  The cooperation yielded some success when in 1998, 900 militants 
surrendered and agreed to enter a government-led rehabilitation program.95  After four 
months of intense violence, Prime Minister Thaksin was willing to grant amnesty to 
militants who had been charged before the 4 January coordinated attack on a Royal Thai 
Army post and arson of 20 schools.96  The consideration of granting amnesty was due 
large part to the previous success joint Thai-Malaysian operations yielded.97  It appears 
that the only formal support the insurgents received from Malaysia is from the Parti Islam 
Se-Malaysia (PAS), which publicly stated that they offered moral support, but nothing 
more.98  This link is most likely because the PAS is the opposition party from Perak, 
Perlis, and Kedah Provinces which border southern Thailand and hold a constituency that 
is generally supportive of the insurgents in southern Thailand.99  However, PAS is an 
opposition party without enough power to change the official stance of the insurgency in 
Kuala Lumpur.  Without official support from the country with which the militants share 
ethnic ties, the argument loses its justification. 
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Even though there is certainly moral support and probably material support from 
the people in northern Malaysia, the lack of official support from Kuala Lumpur helps to 
debase the argument for secession based on ethnic grounds.  There have certainly been 
attacks in the past on the ethnicity and culture of the Malay Muslims, but at this point, a 
lack of Malaysian support serves to confine the problem within the borders of Thailand, 
instead of open it to ethnic borders.  There is little the Malay Muslims of southern 
Thailand can do to garner support from the policy makers in Kuala Lumpur to back them 
either ethnically or religiously, as Kuala Lumpur views the situation as an internal Thai 
problem.  The lack of support from Malaysia helps to explain the shift from ethnic 
motivation to religious motivation. 
3. Students More Schooled in Islam 
 The two ways students are becoming more educated through Islam are through 
local pondoks and by traveling to the Middle East.  In an interview with a former BRN-C 
company commander, Liow and Pathan found that Islam had become a key motivator and 
uniting element for the new generation of fighters.  He also noted that the pondok are 
environments to observe young school children growing up and decide if they are pious 
enough to join the movement.  The BRN-C operative went on to say that his group uses 
religion as a “higher cause towards the liberation of our land and our people.”100  These 
pondoks the BRN-C member spoke of are small, typically all-male, schools generally 
focused on religious teachings and building moral character.  While they yield results 
producing pious Muslim men, they do a poor job teaching them vocational skills.101  It 
seems natural that an insurgent group leader would look here for recruits because they 
can leverage religious motivation on young men who lack workplace skills necessary to 
succeed in the job market. 
In 1961, Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat implemented a plan to promote the quality 
of education that students received through the Pondok Educational Improvement 
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Program.102  While the Thai government was able to standardize the educational process 
in the pondoks to some extent, the transformation upset the leaders of the pondoks as well 
as the traditional system of establishing the Malay-Muslims elites.103  The result was 
deterioration of the quality of schools in Pattani.104  Because students and their parents 
still sought quality Islamic education, many travelled to the Middle East.105  These 
students came back to the pondoks to teach, but because their degrees were from 
countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, they were not allowed to be administrators of the 
pondoks.  Instead, these highly educated men had close, direct contact with generally 
poor, impressionable teenagers each day.  Even though they were not allowed leadership 
positions in the pondoks, they still had considerable status in society, giving their words 
sufficient weight and providing an opportunity for a radical teacher to engrain his views 
of the region in potential fighters’ minds.106  A Middle Eastern educational exodus 
played a part in the shift from ethnic to religious focus in the insurgency. 
4. Fear of the Spread of Global Terrorism 
Besides the Thai government classifying the conflict along religious lines through 
assimilation policies and interference in schooling, authors have also introduced a 
shading of religiousness into the conflict under the pretence of involvement of 
international terrorist groups in the conflict.  Since the attacks on 9/11, there has been an 
initial tendency to group Muslim terrorists into a group that threatens Western and/or 
U.S. interests.  Several authors have drawn strong connections to the fighters in southern 
Thailand to the international terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah and other groups in 
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Southeast Asia.107  Jemaah Islamiyah’s stated goal of global jihad has brought a religious 
connotation to the discussion if an author believes that the group is connected to the 
southern Thailand insurgency.  During the Kru-Ze incident in April 2004 when the 
insurgents first attacked security personnel then sought refuge in the Kru-Ze mosque 
before they were attacked by security forces, some of the bodies had religious teachings 
on them after the attack.108  The scale and method of this attack led some authors to 
believe that jihad had begun in the region.109  Of course, the fact that the insurgents chose 
the historic mosque as the place for their final stand demonstrates the religious nature of 
the conflict.  With these elements, analysts in the post-9/11 era have assumed that the 
conflict is religious in nature. 
Not only are some prominent authors focusing on the religious essence of the 
conflict, but newspapers also tend to focus on the religious element.110  The information 
contained in newspaper reports is critical because many more people read these than read 
the works scholars and experts of the region.  Newspapers have long been an efficient 
way to spread information.  The focus that Thai newspapers now have on religion shape 
the way Thai and world citizens view the conflict.  While they may be an accurate 
description, I believe they have not been complete by leaving out the ethnic element.  In 
the post-9/11 world, it is easy and convenient to group any Muslim insurgents into the 
group of global jihadis even if the history of the region would lead to a different 
conclusion. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The conflict in southern Thailand began as an ethnic, separatist movement, with 
Islam being a central part of the ethnicity of the Malays in the area.  Once the British 
drew and recognized the border in 1909, it impeded the lives of Malays living on separate 
sides of the border.  After assimilation policies began in 1921 with the restructuring of 
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the pondoks, Malay Muslims began to take serious issue with the Siamese state. Thai 
polices included other forms of assimilation tactics, but there remained attempts at 
religious accommodation at the highest levels of the Thai government until Thaksin 
assumed leadership.  At that point, cooperation with Malay Muslim leaders all but 
ceased.  It is at this point that most authors also believe that the insurgency began taking 
on religious tones.  
The fighting took on an Islamic religious current primarily due to four main 
factors. These include Thai policies of assimilation, diminishing Malaysian support, 
growing Middle Eastern education of southern Thais, and finally the impact of the Global 
War on Terror.111  These factors contributed to a generational shift in motivation noticed 
by a former Barisan Revolusi Nasional leader from state separatism to religious fervor.112  
The argument now is not whether the insurgency has become more Islamist, but how 
Islamist it has become. 
In the effort to end the insurgency and bring peace to the region, it is important to 
determine both the origins of the insurgency and its current state.  If policy makers, or 
even soldiers and police on the ground, do not understand that this is a separatist 
movement that has taken on religious motivation, they are unlikely to combat it 
effectively.  When leaders execute policies designed to take on a strictly religious 
opponent that leave out the ethnic, separatist side of the motivation, an opportunity is lost 
to address all of the concerns of the people.  The situation is likewise if leaders fail to 
address religious concerns of the Malay Muslims.  Joll, however, argues that there is little 
value in determining if it is mainly religious in nature.  He states that the religious 
element comes from the interconnectedness and communication structure of the Malay 
Muslim community, which is naturally present.113  It is important for the security leaders 
to understand how the movement came to be religiously motivated and understand that it 
has shifted over the last decade.  The importance lies in the fact that each security official 
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who interacts with the populace must know the origins and motivation of the fighting.  
When the lowest level operators understand the ethnic and religious sides of the fighting, 
they have the chance to seize the opportunity to affect the support base of the insurgency, 
the people.  Additionally, since the motives of the insurgency have become more 
Islamist, it is likely a more permissive environment to invite international terrorist groups 
to the fight. 
In the southern Thailand insurgency, both ethnicity and religion have a great deal 
of importance.  While there is still a connection to the ethnic, separatist sentiments of the 
past, the insurgents have begun to elevate the importance of religion to support 
“solidarity against the infidel Thai state.”114  Harish believes such motivations have come 
from an insurgent leadership more schooled in Islam, failed Thai assimilation policies, a 
lack of official support from Malaysia, and the implications of the Global War on 
Terror.115  Given the context of the fighting today, it seems convenient to place a large 
emphasis on religion in the fighting. 
Religion is certainly a motivating factor, but demands are still ethnic, separatist, 
and political.  Askew states that the goals are often not clear as the leadership and 
structure is also obscure.116  Nonetheless, many of the attacks are against security forces, 
government officials, and teachers, be they Buddhist or Muslim.  The underlying theme 
in the targeting is that the victims typically work for the Thai government at some 
level.117  Leaders are using religion to motivate fighters and incite instability, but religion 
is simply the backbone of the network of connections between the Malay Muslims.118  
The struggle remains ethnic at its core, and this can be seen in who the insurgency targets 
for the purpose of intimidating government officials. 
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If the southern Thailand insurgency turned into a truly religious struggle, 
motivation would exist for Thai insurgents to request assistance from international 
terrorist groups.  Since the struggle remains based on ethnic separatism, there is limited 
potential of such involvement.  The following chapter discusses the involvement of 
international terrorism in southern Thailand and concludes that there is minimal 
involvement.  One of the primary reasons is the ideological difference between a 
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III. INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT 
International support for the southern Thailand insurgency has come from two 
major sources.  The first source is international terrorist groups, and the second source is 
sympathetic Malaysians living just across the border.  The most dangerous of these is 
from international terrorist groups like Jemaah Islamiyah or Al Qaeda.  Involvement of 
international terrorist group networks is the most debatable aspect because evidence 
supporting such connections inconsistent.120  Gunaratna and Abuza are the most 
prominent authors claiming a higher level of potential international terrorist involvement 
than other authors.121  Most other authors believe that there is no connection between the 
southern Thailand insurgency and international terrorist groups except for personal 
connections that were made in Afghanistan during the 1980s.  The other source of 
support comes from directly across the border in Malaysia.  This support technically 
qualifies as international, but, in effect, it is quite local in nature.  The border between the 
two countries is porous, and insurgents on the Thai side have close family ties to people 
on the Malaysian side. Over the past several decades, Thai and Malaysian authorities 
have often cooperated against the insurgents.  However, since 2004, reports of training 
camps and arms caches have surfaced, leading some Thai officials to believe that the 
Malaysian government was responsible for supporting the insurgency, or at least failed to 
halt efforts by private Malaysians to aid the insurgents in southern Thailand.  It is 
important to determine where the support for the insurgency is coming from to coordinate 
better counter-insurgency efforts. 
This chapter describes the reasons why some authors believe that international 
terrorist groups are involved in the insurgency and why they most likely are not.  It then 
describes how sympathetic Malaysians are lending support to the insurgency through 
funding and training while Kuala Lumpur officially desires peace in the Thai provinces.  
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Finally, it describes the relationship between the governments of Thailand and Malaysia 
and how they have coordinated efforts to fight the insurgency. 
A.  INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS 
A main concern of many Southeast Asian terrorism analysts is the possible 
influence or operation of international terrorist groups in southern Thailand.  It stems 
from the proximity of Jemaah Islamiyah to the area and from knowledge about Al Qaeda 
operatives’ work with Jemaah Islamiyah.  Some analysts believe that the Islamic identity 
of insurgents in southern Thailand, as well as their use of tactics like the ones employed 
by insurgents in Iraq, are sufficient to suspect that the insurgents have strong links to 
international terrorist networks.  However, because Jemaah Islamiyah and the southern 
Thai insurgent groups have such different goals (global jihad versus separatism from 
Thailand), such claims should be further examined. 
1. The Argument for a Connection 
Authors who argue there is an international terrorist group connection in southern 
Thailand argue so in three different categories.  First, there is a history of personal 
connections between leaders in southern Thailand and leaders from Jemaah Islamiyah 
and Indonesia.  Second, Jemaah Islamiyah has provided training and propaganda for the 
insurgency.  Finally, southern Thailand has provided a safe haven for members of Jemaah 
Islamiyah while they are on the run from security forces in Indonesia and the Philippines.  
This section presents this argument and evaluates its validity. 
a. Personal Connections 
 Abuza lays out many personal links that Jemaah Islamiyah has with 
southern Thailand insurgent groups.  These links began during the Rabitatul Mujahidin 
(RM) meetings in Malaysia in 1999–2000.  The RM meetings only met three times, but 
the purpose to facilitate coordination of jihadi operations through Jemaah Islamiyah 
across Asia and included separatist groups from Aceh, Thailand, Myanmar, the 
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Philippines, and Bangladesh.122  The ultimate goal of these meetings was to create the 
Islamic state of Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara that dismantled the governments of 
Singapore and Malaysia and created a single Islamic state stretching from mainland 
Malaysia to the southern Philippines.123  Interrogation reports of prominent Jemaah 
Islamiyah leaders and organizers of the RM meetings Hambali, Faiz bin Abu Bakar 
Bafna, and Omar al-Faruq mentioned links to “Islamic militant groups in Pattani, 
Thailand,” and GMIP.124  Additionally, a militant group from southern Thailand called 
Jemaah Salafi, led by Abdul Fatah who has had relations with Jemaah Islamiyah 
members since training in Afghanistan in the 1980s, maintained connections to Jemaah 
Islamiyah.125  One example Abuza cites is when a Jemaah Islamiyah operative went to 
Narathiwat province in September of 2000 to request assistance in arming Jemaah 
Islamiyah and returned with 13 weapons.126  Abuza goes on to cite several more 
connections Jemaah Islamiyah had with Thai Muslims or with Al-Qaeda operatives who 
have stayed in southern Thailand.  He also mentions that Hambali, while captured in 
Ayutthaya, Thailand, also spent some amount of time at a school led by BRN-C head 
Masae Useng, the Th`ammawittaya Foundation School in Yala Province.127 
 Gunaratna also makes connections between the leaders of PULO and the 
Free Aceh Movement of Indonesia.  He cites part of a get-way plan used in the January 
2004 PULO attack on army bases in southern Thailand involved the spreading of nails on 
the road to impede security forces in pursuit.  According to Gunaratna, Aceh militants 
also used this technique.128  Gunaratna also outlines the many connections that were 
made during the RM meetings in Malaysia.129  In his 2005 book, Gunaratna clearly states 
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that while there are personal connections to regional and global terrorist networks, no 
clear organizational connections had been made up to that time, and Jemaah Islamiyah 
and Al Qaeda were unlikely to be the masterminds of the southern Thailand insurgency 
because of a difference in ideology between the southern Thailand separatists and global 
jihadis.130 
 Abuza and Gunaratna describe these personal connections as strong and 
widespread throughout the Southeast Asian region.  However, many of these connections 
predate the 2004 start of the current episode of fighting in southern Thailand.  In a 2007 
interview conducted by Liow and Pathan, a leader of the southern Thailand insurgency 
stated that he was approached by someone claiming to be a member of Jemaah Islamiyah.  
The southern Thailand insurgent stated he did not want the movement to become like 
Jemaah Islamiyah.131  This interview diminishes the credibility of Abuza’s and 
Gunaratna’s claims that personal links to international terrorist groups are helping to 
drive the insurgency. 
b. Training and Propaganda 
 Abuza believes that it is likely that southern Thailand insurgents receive 
training and propaganda support from Jemaah Islamiyah.132  It is also likely that the 
southern Thailand militants sympathize with the efforts of Al Qaeda and Jemaah 
Islamiyah.133  With this sympathy comes mutual understanding between Thai insurgents 
and members of international terrorist organizations where the Thai militants are 
receptive towards assistance from Jemaah Islamiyah.  However, they are still wary of 
direct assistance from outside terrorist groups. 
 Davis states that the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) gets it 
inspiration, support, and training from the Middle East and that it was named with 
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reference to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).134  Also, leaders in the PULO 
are known to have training relations with the Free Aceh Movement.135  These 
connections to foreign terrorist groups demonstrate the desire for the PULO to reach out, 
but only with secular-based movements.  These links are in contrast to the BRN-C 
leaders who received religious training in Indonesia and returned to teaching positions in 
southern Thailand.136 
 Additionally, Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islam of Bangladesh (HUJI-B) was 
involved with training groups of Thai insurgents.137  These camps had trainers from Al 
Qaeda who previously worked in the training camps in Afghanistan.  Additionally, HUJI-
B also directed substantial funding to the southern Thailand militants.  HUJI-B is a 
founding member of the Osama bin Laden-affiliated International Islamic Front, which, 
coupled with trainers from Afghanistan, give the Bangladeshi group significant ties to Al 
Qaeda.138  While the connection to HUJI-B may have existed, these reports are largely 
based on the use of similar tactics with interrogation reports turning up no linkages 
between southern insurgents and the group.139  The U.S. put HUJI-B on the list of 
Foreign Terrorist Organizations in 2010.140  The group still exists as a terrorist 
organization, but its effectiveness has diminished since the mid-2000s.141 
 Links between international terrorist organizations and the southern 
Thailand insurgents regarding training and propaganda efforts likely existed, but the 
effectiveness and reasoning is debatable.  If links existed, are they because southern 
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Thailand militants were seeking out other sources of training, or were international 
terrorist organizations actively seeking involvement in the fighting?  Did similar tactics 
mean a connection between groups because of training?  In the absence of direct 
evidence, we should not assume that the use in Thailand of tactics found in Iraq implies 
that insurgents in Thailand received training by insurgents from Iraq. After all, the Thais 
could have learned the tactics simply by watching television.  Also, ideologies of groups 
like Jemaah Islamiyah and PULO are quite different with regards to motivation (global 
jihad versus separatism).  It is more likely that the southern Thailand militants sought and 
will continue to seek training outside of Thailand because there are sympathetic 
organizations with more funding, not because outside terrorist groups are directly 
supporting them.    
c. Safe Havens 
 Southern Thailand has served as a safe haven for terrorists on the run in 
Southeast Asia.  The most prominent of these is the Jemaah Islamiyah leader Hambali 
who was arrested in Ayutthaya, Thailand, after he sought refuge in Narathiwat Province 
in 2002.142  Abdul Fatah, the leader of the southern Thai insurgent group Jemaah Salafi, 
helped Hambali plan attacks as well as organized a meeting between Hambali and 
another Jemaah Salafi member in Bangkok.143  In May 2003, Singaporean and Malaysian 
Jemaah Islamiyah members were arrested in southern Thailand.144  These reports suggest 
that members of Jemaah Islamiyah may be seeking refuge in Thailand, and particularly in 
the south.  However, these reports are dated, and there is a lack of recent reports of 
international terrorist leaders seeking a safe haven in southern Thailand.  Because 
personal connections still exist, even if they are not presently being leveraged, and 
southern Thailand has been used as a safe haven, the potential exists for international 
terrorist leaders to return in the future. 
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2. Evaluating the Connection 
There appear to be several leaps in the arguments of Abuza and Gunaratna about 
the importance of international terrorist groups in the region, particularly Jemaah 
Islamiyah.  Astute observers recognize that members of Jemaah Islamiyah have 
conducted operations in Thailand, but these operations do not link them directly to the 
fighting in the south.  Analysts also recognize that insurgents from southern Thailand 
have crossed paths with international terror leaders in Indonesia, Pakistan, or 
Afghanistan, but these meetings do not necessarily link the movements to the fighting in 
Thailand.  While Abuza and Gunaratna have backed their arguments with accounts of 
many personal encounters between Thai insurgents and foreign terrorists, and of training 
camps in Aceh or Bangladesh where southern Thailand insurgents have trained, there is 
little hard evidence of actual assistance or management from international terrorist 
groups.  It is most likely that the high-profile global terrorists captured in Thailand were 
there more because of the convenience of Thailand that Abuza alluded to in 2002 than 
because of any ideological similarity to insurgents in Thailand’s southern provinces.145 
The previously described training connections point to similar tactics being used 
by either Jemaah Islamiyah or HUJI-B.  Liow and Pathan point out that many scholars 
who study modern insurgencies would find that quick, strategic attacks such as 
motorcycle drive-by shootings and market bombing are common tactics.146  Reasonable 
scholars could also conclude that the southern Thailand insurgents did not need to 
conduct training with the Free Aceh movement to develop the method of scattering nails 
on the escape path to slow pursuing officials.  It is likely that the southern Thailand 
insurgents already had a level of proficiency to accomplish their goals without the 
assistance of outside groups.147 
It is clear that connections between southern Thailand insurgents and international 
terrorist organizations has declined in the past 5 to 7 years, but even after Jemaah 
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Islamiyah’s power began to wane, Abuza still suggested in 2009 that it would “eventually 
attempt to make itself central to the conflict.148  The reality is that past connections have 
either decreased in importance or vanished, and a lack of ideological similarity 
discourages insurgents in southern Thailand from seeking direct assistance from 
international terrorist groups.  A more important source of support comes from 
sympathetic citizens from Thailand’s neighbors to the south, Malaysia. 
B. MALAYSIA’S ROLE IN SOUTHERN THAILAND 
It is important to examine the role Malaysia plays in setting the conditions for the 
insurgency.  This section describes the involvement of criminals and sympathetic 
Malaysian citizens in supporting the insurgency and Malaysia’s response to those 
activities and Thailand’s requests for assistance.  Support of terrorist operations comes 
from funding, training, and equipping.  An uncontrolled border between Thailand and 
Malaysia facilitates these logistical operations.  Support from Malaysia in coordinating 
anti-terrorism efforts seeks to address these issues, but sometimes not to the satisfaction 
of Thai authorities. 
Malaysia is the most plausible source of international support because the 
evidence is stronger and more recent.  Reports of capture of militants and war materiel 
are usually more reliable because both Malaysia and Thailand are involved in the capture.  
Reports of support are quite frequent.  As the southern Thailand insurgency has escalated, 
Jemaah Islamiyah has waned in power, suggesting that the southern Thailand insurgents 
receive support from elsewhere.  Malaysians provide that support through funding, 
training, and materiel. 
Because of the cultural and ethnic similarity of the people of northern Malaysia 
and southern Thailand, private Malaysians and the northern Malaysia based political 
party Parti Islam seMalaysia (PAS) have shared roles in lending moral support and 
funding to the southern Thailand insurgents.  In 2004, Thai Government security adviser 
Kitti Rattanachaya believed that the Islamic separatist movement in southern Thailand 
was receiving assistance from the Kumpulan Mujahedeen Malaysia (KMM), an 
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organization that is the Malaysian branch of Jemaah Islamiyah.149  Jane’s currently 
assesses the KMM as a dormant organization, but it was once thought to have 60 
members.150  The cultural relations between the people of northern Malaysian and 
Southern Thailand and Malaysia’s dual-citizenship policy (which has been discussed 
openly by both Thai and Malaysian officials) complicate matters.151 
1.  Funding 
Funding is an important part of any insurgency, and security efforts to slow or 
halt funding are important.  Thai leaders have taken positions that large sums of money 
are coming from tom yum soup restaurants in northern Malaysia and shops in Kuala 
Lumpur.  Pictures were released in February 2012 of Thai Police Colonel Thavee 
Sodsong visiting these restaurants in northern Malaysia.152  While the level and 
importance of funding is debatable, it is clear that these venues are still important to Thai 
security officials.  
Prominent Thai officials have made claims that private Malaysian organizations 
are funding the southern Thailand insurgency.  In 2007, former Thai Prime Minster, 
General (retired) Surayud, accused Malaysian soup restaurants of funding the 
insurgency.153  Then-Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont commented in 2007 that 
Malaysian soup kitchens were a major source of funding.  The evidence for this claim 
was not reliable, and his remarks angered the government in Kuala Lumpur.154  However, 
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it has been documented that shopkeepers and soup kitchens in Malaysia are providing 
funding for the insurgency in southern Thailand, just not to the extent Thai leaders 
believed.155  Davis believes that while it is difficult to estimate the amount of money 
funding the insurgency, it is likely a relatively small amount, due in part to skimming 
along the process.156  In confidential discussions in Malaysia, Vatikiotis learned that 
expatriate Patani shopkeepers, particularly in the city of Kuala Lumpur, donated RM 
1,000 each month to members of the GMIP and/or BRN-C.157  This network rose 
approximately US $300 per month per group member to provide monetary support to the 
southern Thailand insurgency.158  These shops and the soup kitchens that supposedly 
provided RM 100 per month could provide a substantial amount of income to the 
insurgency, but it is most likely that whatever was actually taken was reduced by 
skimming that potentially went to funding bureaucratic budgets for schools and services 
in the insurgency-affected areas.159 The previously mentioned evidence suggests 
Malaysians are providing support, but the official stance of Malaysia is noninterference.  
Kuala Lumpur is not officially providing funding, but fund raising activities do take place 
inside Malaysia’s borders. 
2. Training and Materiel 
Evidence exists that Thai insurgents use areas of northern Malaysia for training 
and acquiring materiel for use in southern Thailand.  These claims are somewhat 
controversial, but they exist nonetheless.  In December 2004, former Prime Minister 
Thaksin Shinawatra accused Malaysia of harboring training camps in the northern 
Malaysian state of Kelantan, which borders southern Thailand.  The basis of the 
accusation was photographs offered by Deputy Interior Minister Sutham Saengprathum 
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that an unnamed source provided without dates.160  The pictures were clear enough to be 
used as evidence in court, and the former Prime Minister used them as leverage to accuse 
both Malaysia and Indonesia of having ties with the terrorists conducting activities in 
Thailand.161  Malaysia reacted by accusing Thaksin of attempting to cover up the Thai’s 
inability to control the insurgency that had reignited in January of 2004.162  It is now 
widely known that logistic support has come out of Malaysia, but in 2004, when Thaksin 
made these incendiary statements, Thai intelligence was regarded as vague by 
Malaysia.163 
In more recent years, more evidence has emerged that insurgent training is taking 
place in Malaysia.  Thai intelligence officials state that clandestine training camps located 
in both Thailand and Malaysia are the locations where numerous commandos trained 
before conducting large-scale attacks in Thailand.164  According to Thai intelligence, 
insurgents who trained at these camps were responsible for the large-scale, coordinated 
January 19, 2011, arms raid in Ra-ngae district and the April 29, 2011, attack on busses 
full of Royal Thai marines returning from leave.165  These types of attacks display a level 
of brazenness and coordination rarely seen before 2010, and the highly-specialized 
training of insurgent commandos in Thailand and Malaysia is a significant contributing 
factor.166 
Evidence suggests that Malaysia is also a source of materiel.  Thai intelligence 
officials believe that ammonium nitrate frequently came into southern Thailand from 
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Malaysia.167  On December 14, 2009, Malaysia criminal investigators looking for drug 
traffickers found a large cache of IED making materials in Pasir Mas district, Kelantan.  
Thai intelligence officials believed there were four or five more such caches in Malaysia 
close to the Thai border.168  It is apparent that the southern Thailand insurgents are using 
Malaysia as a source of materiel. 
3.  Ease of Border Crossing to Malaysia 
The ease with which supporters of the insurgency can cross the border facilitates 
funds, training, and materiel support.  Furthermore, the cultural relations between the 
people of northern Malaysia and southern Thailand create a complicated situation along 
the Malaysian border.  While the government of Malaysia may denounce the separatist 
movement, many people in Malaysia sympathize with the Malay-Muslim separatist 
movement.  The ease of border crossings combined with the fact that many people living 
and working in southern Thailand are dual citizens of Malay ethnicity concerns the Thai 
government, but little has been done to effectively control the border.  
Thailand has identified dual citizenship as a major factor contributing to the 
insurgents’ ability to evade capture.  The problem with a policy of dual citizenship is that 
insurgents can operate in Thailand and then quickly escape into Malaysia where Thai 
officials currently do not have the right to “hot pursuit.”  Likewise, insurgents hiding in 
Malaysia could plan and train there for an operation in Thailand, cross the border, and 
carry out the attacks.  Both parties have agreed that the dual citizenship issue presents 
serious problems to controlling the insurgency, but little has been done to end the policy 
on either side.169 
The problem of dual citizenship is exacerbated by the fact that even when people 
cross the border legally, they cross with significant ease.  The border crossing at Sungei 
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Golok has been problematic because it was notorious for ease of crossing due to a general 
lack of law enforcement in ensuring people crossing the border had proper 
documentation.170  Malaysians and Thais who wish to cross the border without proper 
documentation can do so at Sungei Golok, so ending Malaysia’s dual-citizenship program 
will not halt the insurgent assistance from Malaysia unless the border is effectively 
controlled.171 
Even if Thailand and Malaysia agreed to end the practice of dual citizenship, the 
core problem of uncontrolled border crossing will still continue because people can easily 
cross the border without proper documentation at crossings like Sungei Golok.172  Until 
Thailand controls the border, it cannot expect the reap results from an unlikely end to 
dual citizenship.  To combat the problem of a porous border, Thaksin proposed in 
February of 2004 that security fences be built along some of the more notorious portions 
of the border in an effort to prevent criminals who killed Thai officials to run back to 
Malaysia.173 Again in February 2007, Thailand proposed to build a security fence in 
order to control migration to and from Malaysia.  The proposal was for a 17-mile security 
fence to assist in controlling flows of people in the troublesome Betong district, Yala 
province.174  However, the proposed fence will not control immigration at the previously 
mentioned Sungei Golok crossing in Narathiwat province due to the persistent corruption 
on both sides of the border.175  Thai and Malaysian officials claimed to have increased 
border security operations, but because of corruption, known criminals have been 
allowed to cross in and out of Thailand.176 
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Security fence problems also create cross-border diplomatic difficulties with 
Malaysia.  Thaksin first suggested the construction of a security fence in 2005.  His 
proposal was to stop “militant infiltration” by sealing off the entire 500 kilometer 
border.177  Malaysia took serious issue with the proposal, mostly because Malaysia 
insists that no militants exist on the southern side of the border.178  The 2007 proposal’s 
stated goal is to confront “problems with border crossings and smuggling.”179  Former 
Prime Minister Surayud believed that the Thai government could go ahead with 
construction without the consent of Kuala Lumpur, even though the outrage over the first 
proposal was in recent memory.180  While the goal and span of the fence did not anger 
Malaysia as much as Thaksin’s proposal, neglecting to discuss the issue with the southern 
neighbor did not aid in repairing damaged relations stemming from the Thaksin regime. 
C. COORDINATION BETWEEN THAILAND AND MALAYSIA  
Modern Thai-Malaysian border cooperation dates back to 1949 with the creation 
of the Thai-Malaysian Police Frontier Agreement.  Formal cooperation continues today 
with the Agreement Between the Government of Malaysia and the Government of 
Thailand on Border Cooperation signed by the two states in 1977.181  These agreements, 
and several others in between, were mainly an effort to contain the Communist Party of 
Malaya (CPM) when it sought refuge in Thailand to conduct attacks in Malaya, but they 
were also geared to focus on cross-border crime and smuggling.  Thailand’s interests in 
the agreements became more prominent in March of 1970 with the creation of the 
Antiterrorism Agreement that was specifically written to combat both Malayan 
Communists and Thai Muslim insurgents.182  Malaysia’s interests were primarily to 
defeat the CPM as it did not agree with Muslims being lumped into the same category as 
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the Communists it was fighting.183  Although relations were shaky between Thailand and 
Malaysia regarding the Muslim separatist movement, the border agreement between the 
two states is still viewed as one of the most successful in ASEAN.184 The 
institutionalization of the agreement is the most effective aspect of the Thai-Malaysian 
security arrangement.  In 1959, the two states created the General Border Committee 
(GBC) and the Regional Border Committee (RBC).  The GBC’s mission was to develop 
policies to eradicate insurgents along the border.  The RBC was to coordinate tactics, 
intelligence sharing, and supervision for combined Thai-Malaysian operations against 
insurgents.185  Intelligence sharing has been an informal part of the Thai-Malaysian 
agreement since 1949, but it was further institutionalized into operations with the 1965 
creation of the combined intelligence headquarters designed to track and report insurgent 
activities.  Thailand and Malaysia allow for “reciprocal posting” of intelligence and 
report size, activity, and location of insurgents as well as effective tactics against them.186  
This basis of coordination between the borders led to a new agreement in 2010 that 
reworked border security issues to include bilateral military operations and allowed for 
more permissive economic activity in the border area.187 
Thailand and Malaysia have made much progress on border security, but there 
have been serious political issues that detract from the effectiveness of these policies.  
Malaysia took diplomatic heat in 1998 from the international Organization of Islamic 
Conference (OIC) for turning over suspected militants to Thai authorities who would 
presumably mistreat them.  More recently, the Tak Bai incident of October 2004 that 
resulted in the suffocation of 78 prisoners drew international attention to Thailand, and 
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Malaysia withdrew its offer for security cooperation.188  On a personal level, Malaysian 
Prime Minister Abdullah was particularly offended that the Thaksin regime would take 
such harsh and irresponsible measures against Malaya Muslims only nine days after the 
two officials shook hands on the Golok River Bridge at the border of the two states.189  
Another source of Malaysian concern occurred when 131 Malay Muslims fled to 
Malaysia to escape Thai authorities’ presumed injustices in August of 2005.  In keeping 
with the ASEAN tradition of noninterference, Bangkok suggest that Kuala Lumpur keep 
the issue quiet to allow the two states to solve the problem without outside influence.  
Given the close time proximity to the Tak Bai incident and previous international 
concerns of Malaysia handing over prisoners for potential mistreatment by Thai 
authorities, Malaysia contacted the United Nations Commission for Refugees for a 
visit.190  Bangkok felt betrayed by its neighbor it had helped counter the communist 
insurgency for so many years. 
In a rash of ill-conceived logic, Bangkok became impatient with Malaysia’s lack 
of cooperation in extraditing refugees or prisoners and believes that Kuala Lumpur’s 
behavior is directly aiding separatists.  Further, some analysts in Bangkok believe that 
Malaysia is looking for greater Muslim support by aiding the Muslim separatist 
movement.191  Based on the evidence, it seems that the problem is not Malaysia’s support 
for the insurgents but the Thai authorities’ mistreatment of its own prisoners.  To further 
complicate matters, Thailand had engaged in what Kuala Lumpur regarded as the 2003 
extra-judicial killing of GMIP member Manase Jeh-da, who was extradited to Thailand 
days before he was killed by Thai authorities.192  However, both states believe that the 
other is behaving inappropriately in the matter of coordinated border security efforts, and 
relations have suffered greatly.  In 2007, Malaysia and Thailand addressed these 
grievances by cooperatively building up economic and educational infrastructures in 
                                                 




192 International Crisis Group, “Stalemate in Southern Thailand,” 5. 
 53
southern Thailand.193  Malaysia even offered to serve as an objective third-party 
moderator in order to assist Thai authorities in striking a deal with the insurgents.194  
Malaysia seems willing to work with Thailand to reestablish bilateral security ties, but 
Bangkok must help its cause by not abusing human rights and staying away from 
unsubstantiated claims of Malaysian assistance in the southern Thailand separatist 
movement. 
Bangkok remains skeptical of the efforts of Kuala Lumpur in part because of 
Kuala Lumpur’s soft approach to the “separatist old guard.”195  The purpose of allowing 
known BRN leaders freedom of maneuver in Malaysia, according to former Prime 
Minister Mahathir, was to allow the old guard a place to speak freely on behalf of the 
Malay Muslims in southern Thailand with rules forbidding them to speak poorly of or 
take up arms against either Thai or Malaysian governments.  These rules have driven 
some of the old guard to the more democratic and permissive Indonesia.196  This stance 
addresses two of Malaysia’s priorities to prevent the violence to spill over into Malaysia 
and not turn a blind eye to the suppression of the Malay Muslims.197  
While separate efforts by the governments of Thailand and Malaysia will interdict 
some of the insurgent activity, the most effective way to handle the cross-border situation 
is through intelligence-sharing between the states.  The anti-terrorism pact between 
Thailand and Malaysia is a formal building block, but the actual method of 
implementation has come into question due to some embarrassments in the higher 
reaches of both governments.  Thailand and Malaysia must coordinate efforts and 
intelligence to build an executable plan for this cross-border problem.198 
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D. CONCLUSION 
The involvement of international terrorists in Thailand appears to be based on 
their perception of Thailand as “nation of convenience” and not a desire to play a role in 
the southern Thailand insurgency.  Humanitarian issues exist in southern Thailand, and 
much of insurgents’ support comes from a Malaysian perception of injustice in Thailand 
because of failed Thai policies.  There is reason to be concerned that regional terrorist 
groups may join the fight against the Thai state in support of their religious brethren, but 
evidence for this is lacking.  In fact, southern Thailand insurgents have turned assistance 
away from such groups.  In interviews conducted by Liow and Pathan, Jemaah Islamiyah 
members approached an insurgent leader offering assistance, but they were turned away 
for two primary reasons.  First, the Jemaah Islamiyah operators had little concern for the 
cause of the southern Thailand insurgents.  Secondly, the southern fighters did not want 
to be associated with global movements and the attention they would bring from the 
West.199  International support for the insurgency seems to come from directly south of 
the Thai border much more than from regional or global hubs of terror. 
Thai-Malaysian border relations, while strained, remain formalized and somewhat 
effective.  There is a decades-long history of Thai accusations that Malaysia is not fully 
committed to fighting the insurgency, but Bangkok has given Kuala Lumpur reason to be 
wary by its extrajudicial killing of extradited criminals.  Also, Malaysia has different 
priorities in quelling the insurgency.  Of course, it wishes to see the end of violence, but 
Thailand desires to end the violence and assimilate the Muslim Malays into the Thai 
nation by killing or capturing militants.  Malaysia has more pragmatic goals to contain 
the violence inside Thailand, prevent the arising of an international jihadi movement out 
of what is a Malay ethno-centric struggle, and to be viewed as sympathetic to the plight 
of mistreated Malays by Thai security forces.200  Thailand can stand to gain much ground 
by approaching its relationship with Malaysia in a more tactful manner in order to gain 
intelligence, which has remained a critical shortfall of the counterinsurgency fight by 
incorporating Malay security forces who at minimum speak the language of the 
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separatists.201  Improved cross-border relations could also result in better diplomatic ties 
with other nations where insurgents are involved, such as Indonesia.  If Thailand 
continues being viewed as the bully in the insurgency, cooperation will remain minimal. 
Even though support comes primarily from Malaysia, there is still a need to 
remain alert to indications that international terrorists are operating in the border 
provinces.  In 2006, there was great concern that several well-funded international 
terrorist groups were considering taking over the southern border region of Thailand.202  
These concerns remain today with all scholars, some more so than others.  Since security 
and intelligence resource are limited, however, the focus should be on ending support 
from across the border instead of combating a future threat from international terrorists.  
The southern Thailand insurgency is likely to remain localized with support from 
Malaysia because it is a struggle based on ethnic separatism.  International terrorists with 
regional or global aspirations do not want to waste resources on a movement that 
provides little towards their goals.  Likewise, the southern Thailand insurgents do not 
want the attention that comes with associating with international terrorists.
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The fighting in southern Thailand makes it one of the most dangerous places in 
the world today in spite of the lack of direct involvement of international terrorist 
groups.203  It is imperative that security policy makers understand the causes of the 
insurgency and the actors.  The evidence shows that while the insurgency is taking on a 
religious tone, it still remains an ethnic struggle for separatism.  Leaders are using 
religious networks to recruit and motivate fighters, but the targets of the violence are 
typically government agents who are viewed as conspirators of the state.  The evidence 
also shows that while international terrorists have shown an interest in the conflict, 
international support for the southern Thailand insurgency ultimately comes from their 
neighbors in northern Malaysia.  Ethnicity, proximity, and a poorly controlled border 
contribute to the ease of this support.  Malays want to help the people they view as the 
victims of a repressive Thai state.  International terrorists are not likely to join in such a 
fight, as long as insurgents focus demands on autonomy. 
Malaysia cannot be viewed as indifferent to the fact that some of its citizens 
support the fighting in southern Thailand, but it also cannot be perceived as giving in to 
Thai pressure against its own ethnic brethren.  The Malaysian government should balance 
policies to address the religious and humanitarian concerns of their citizens and assist 
Thai authorities in bringing peace to southern Thailand.  Both Malaysia and Thailand 
would benefit from peace in Thailand’s south, but each government must work with the 
other, balancing internal politics with regional policies, to reach an acceptable, effective 
plan of action. 
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A.  PROPOSITIONS FOR FUTURE INCREASE IN INTERNATIONAL 
TERRORIST GROUP INVOLVEMENT 
 There remains a danger that international terrorists may involve themselves in the 
fight, whether they are invited or not, and analysts should remain vigilant for such 
connections in the future.204  The dangers with regional terrorist groups in the fighting 
are the increased levels of experience, command and control, and funding.  The best-case 
scenario is to end the fighting, or at least achieve a minimal level of insurgent-based 
violence, before international terror groups gain control of the situation.  If this does not 
happen, the consequences are that the fighting could begin to resemble the fighting in 
Iraq with Western and Islamic fighters waging war in the area. 
 A concern exists that international terrorist may get involved in the fighting 
because a reduced number of U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan could create an influx 
of fighters trying to remain relevant in their own causes.205  The concern is that these 
highly-trained fighters will move to wherever they see the next venue for jihad, which 
could be Thailand due to its cooperation with the United States. in Iraq and the 
mismanagement of the crisis.206  The southern provinces may become a planning or 
staging area for international terrorists to launch attacks on Western targets in Thailand. 
 While there is a potential for outside terrorist involvement within the Thai 
borders, it remains unlikely they will directly involve themselves in the southern 
Thailand conflict.  The ideologies of Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah are vastly different 
from the separatist fighters’ ideologies because they are focused on global jihad and 
defeating the United States and Israel.207  Not even the other Muslims in Thailand want 
to get involved in the south.208  Likewise, the Malay Muslims of southern Thailand as of 
yet do not desire to be tied to any of the global Islamist groups for fear of the attention 
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such an affiliation would bring.209  The potential to use the southern provinces as a 
staging area is more likely due to potential sympathy from the local Malay Muslims. 
B. HOW TO END INSURGENCY AND AVOID INTERNATIONAL 
TERRORIST GROUP INVOLVEMENT 
It is important for Thailand to at minimum gain control of the southern provinces 
before international terrorists do join the fighting.  Bangkok has had a difficult time 
managing the insurgency without outside influence from international terror.  If these 
groups moved into the region, the situation would likely become too complex for the 
Thais to solve alone.  Security forces need to drive a wedge between the insurgents and 
the populace to provide critical services and a legitimate economic foundation before 
international terrorist provide that role. 
A good step for Bangkok to take would be to invite a third party to mediate 
discussions between insurgents and security forces.  However, this method is unlikely 
because Thailand has “categorically rejected” involving third parties in the talks for fear 
of being forced into granting independence followed by secession of the border 
provinces.210  Malaysia seems a likely fit to fulfill this role, and Kuala Lumpur has 
usually been helpful in assisting Thailand.  Malaysians are sympathetic to the insurgents’ 
cause, but the official stance is to support efforts to end the insurgency.  Thailand has 
harmed relations by making public accusations that Kuala Lumpur was facilitating the 
insurgency.  Thailand needs to make an effort to repair relations so that it can co-opt 
Malaysia into a peace-talks forum with the Thai interests of non-secession in mind. 
History leads us to believe that the southern Thailand insurgency is about 
preserving the culture of the Malays and the old Kingdom of Patani.  Religion is a main 
aspect of this culture, and security forces should be aware of this undercurrent.  Thailand 
should focus efforts to develop the economy of the region while improving border 
security.   
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Thai security forces need to address the issues of the populace to persuade them to 
stop cooperating with and aiding the insurgents and start reporting their activity, reducing 
the permissiveness of the area.  Statements from Gunaratna that “the immediate challenge 
facing the Thai authorities is to disrupt existing links between the insurgents and foreign 
organizations,” are misguided as these connections are unproven.211  Steps should be 
taken to end the insurgency before Gunaratna’s and Abuza’s perceptions become a 
dangerous reality.  In order to maintain control, Thailand must recognize that the Malays 
do not desire to be Thai.  If they continue to be treated as sub-Thai, they will continue to 
revolt.  There should be a level playing field with the Thais and Malays that fosters 
security and economic development. 
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